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Abstract 
From the mid-19
th 
Century until the Great Depression, banks, insurance companies and other large 
institutional investors supplied railways with external capital that supported their rise to near hegemony over 
transport in the U.S. This regime ended in the 1930‟s, when widespread rail bankruptcies threatened broader 
credit markets. The federal government intervened via a powerful, new, public financial intermediary—the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation—to socialize devalued rail debt, which largely removed private 
institutional investors from rail capital markets. At this defining moment, the Roosevelt Administration could 
have used its financial and political leverage to rationalize structural weaknesses in the rail industry. It did 
not. Thus by the time the Depression ended, railways were significantly weakened vis a vis their increasingly 
successful competitors in highway-based transport. Thus, the decline of American railways was caused more 
by financial factors than, as existing historiography suggests, by either excessive government regulation or 
failures of railway management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost a century, starting in the mid-1800‟s, railways dominated transport in the United States. 
Then, a seismic shift occurred as cars, buses and trucks became the dominant carriers of passenger and 
freight traffic and the rail industry declined to a shadow of its former self. This shift began around 
World War I, reached its tipping point during the Great Depression and was consolidated after the end of 
World War II. A variety of factors contributed to the change, including inflexible regulation of railway 
rates; provision of government subsidies to highways, but not railways; inequitable taxation of railways; 
and failures of rail management. While these aspects of the decline of rail have been well studied, an 
important gap in the relevant historiography involves changes in the provision of capital to railways, 
particularly during the watershed years of the Great Depression. Before the 1930‟s, railways depended 
in significant measure on large financial institutions—banks, insurance companies, endowments, trusts 
and other institutional investors—to supply them with capital coming from other than internally 
generated earnings. Financial institutions acted both as intermediaries, selling stock and bonds, and 
purchased large quantities of rail securities for their own asset portfolios. At the turn of the 20
th
 century, 
22% of asset portfolios of large financial institutions were in rail stock and bonds.
1
 Between that point in 
time and the onset of the Great Depression, even in the face of significant growth of highway-based 
transport, institutional investors continued to increase their holdings of rail assets. But then, during the 
defining moment of the great Depression, they changed course and divested from rail, aided and abetted 
by the interventions of a newly created, powerful, public financial intermediary, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC). The RFC was created in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover and expanded 
under President Franklin Roosevelt partly to deal with the presence of large amounts of devalued and 
illiquid rail securities on bank balance sheets, which was contributing to a freeze in private credit. In the 
early 1930‟s the RFC purchased hundred of millions of dollars worth of these devalued securities and 
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thereby helped to stabilize both bank and railway company finances. But, by socializing rail securities, 
the RFC also contributed to removing private institutional investors from rail capital markets, 
decoupling them from their historic relationship as primary suppliers of external capital to railways. 
Thus, RFC policies produced the unintended consequence of weakening the supply of external, private 
capital to railways. Combined with President Roosevelt‟s failure to intervene strongly to rationalize the 
rail industry, this is, I argue, is an important, but until now, overlooked reason why railways entered the 
post-World War II era in a weakened position via a vis their competitors in highway-based transport.   
 
In researching the historic change that occurred in the relationship between institutional investors, the 
state and railways during the 1930‟s, I address three related questions: first, why did financial 
institutions continue to maintain large holdings in railway securities in the decades before the Great 
Depression even though they were witnessing the rise of significant competition from highway-based 
transport? Second, what specific circumstances caused them to shift out of rail finance in the 1930‟s? 
Third, how did politics combine with capital finance during the inter-war years to affect the subsequent 
shift towards the dominance of highway transport in the U.S.? In answering these questions, this article 
provides new evidence concerning ways in which historic changes in the structuring of capital finance 
affected the shift from rail to highway dominance in American transportation in the mid-20
th
 century. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONTEXT 
Running through much of the historiography concerning the decline of railroads in the United States is a 
debate—sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit—between those who blame excessive government 
regulation and those who attribute rail‟s problems to the internal failures of corporate management. 
Albro Martin is a major exemplar of the former school. He argues that “the unwillingness of the 
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Interstate Commerce Commission to grant general rate increases…(after) the enactment of the Hepburn 
Act in 1906 prevented the flow of investment funds from keeping pace with the demands upon the 
system and paved the way for a collapse in profitability of railroad operations after 1911.”2 In the latter 
school are Thompson, Cochran and others who argue that rail management failed to adapt to the 
changing competitive landscape of transportation, especially to the rapid growth of highway-based 
transport after World War I.
3
  
 
My research suggests that this debate establishes a false dichotomy inn that it ignores the ways in which 
major public and private financial institutions influenced the shift from railway to highway dominance 
of American transport, particularly during the 1930‟s. Although the role of banks and insurance 
companies in financing the development of American railways in the period before World War I is 
richly documented in rail historiography,
4
 the investment policies of these and other large institutional 
investors in the inter-war years is far less well studied. Two most important studies for this period are 
Carosso‟s landmark history of investment banking5 and Goldsmith‟s equally important compilation of 
primary data on the assets of banks and insurance companies, 1900-1952.
6
 Supplementing these are 
Kotz‟s synthesis of research on bank control of corporations7 and more specific studies of banking and 
insurance in the inter-war years.
8
 For the Great Depression, works by Olson, Schiffman and Mason 
explain the operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation during the New Deal;
9
 Rose and 
others provides important insights into the politics of transportation policy in the years leading up to and 
during the 1930‟s;10 and Bordo‟s notion of a “defining moment”11 provides a conceptual handle that is 
applied specifically to the transport sector in this article.   
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Some of the works just cited include primary data used here. Most importantly, the appendices to 
Goldsmith‟s book include information from the Federal Reserve Bank and Comptroller of the Currency 
on the railway stock and bond holdings of commercial and savings banks, insurance companies and 
investment companies. This specific data has never previously been culled from Goldsmith‟s appendices 
for interpretive purposes.
12
 To this I add two important components by including the rail assets of 
private investment banks and trust funds. Those assets do not appear in the Goldsmith appendices 
because investment banks were not subject to government regulation and were not legally required to 
make a public accounting of their holdings. Yet, Carosso‟s monograph and Kotz‟s synthesis of banking 
research indicate that approximately 250 U.S. private investment banks dominated the capital markets 
for railroad securities between 1865 and World War I and continued to play a major role into the 
1930‟s,13 so my analysis takes this information into account. Similarly, with regard to trust funds, the 
data in Goldsmith‟s appendices is not broken out specifically for railroads. Yet, both Carosso and Kotz 
describe how trust funds were mainly investors in blue chip stocks and secure bonds, of which rail was 
considered the gold standard.
14
 Thus, I include trust funds in this article. In short, my analysis abstracts  
statistics on railway capital finance from Goldsmith‟s broader data set, then adds information on the rail 
assets of investment banks and trust funds. 
 
Four other primary sources also provided pertinent information on rail finances. First, documents and 
data from the archives of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation show how that agency crucially 
influenced the finances of railways and their large institutional creditors in the 1930‟s.15 Second, annual 
reports from the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was closely involved with monitoring and 
regulating rail finances, are used.
16
 Third, specialized reports on railway finances produced by banks, 
insurance companies, allied institutional investors and their professional associations provide important 
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information on the attitudes and policies of these organizations.
17
 Finally, government reports, including 
those of the Office of the Coordinator of Transportation, a key agency that President Roosevelt hoped 
would help solve the transportation crisis of the 1930‟s, provide perspective on the federal response 
during these years.
18
 This material is supplemented by secondary sources that deal with the investment 
behavior of large institutional investors. 
 
SOURCES AND OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL FOR RAIL 
From their beginnings in the 19
th
 century, railroads relied significantly on external sources of financing 
that supplemented internally generated earnings to supply capital for construction and expansion. Some 
of this external capital came from public sources, such as state and local governments, which either 
purchased railway stock or provided direct loans; some came from land grants from the federal 
government (though these mainly supported the western and trans-national railroads built after 1850); 
and some came from individual investors.
19
 However, by the mid to late 19
th
 century large private 
institutions came to dominate external rail finance. Investment banks such as J. P. Morgan and 
Company, Kuhn Loeb, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers; commercial banks such as First National 
of New York; and insurance companies such as New York Life and Equitable, issued hundred of 
millions of dollars worth of stock and bonds (loans) that allowed railway corporations to construct new 
lines, merge with one another, and to expand both regionally and nationally. As these institutions issued 
and traded rail securities they took control of emerging American financial markets and, in the absence 
of strong government regulation, they manipulated stock prices, issued both overvalued (“watered”) 
stock and excessive loans, and built large fortunes. Thus the stocks and bonds of private rail 
corporations became the most prevalent form of securities traded in U.S. capital markets by the late 19
th
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century,
20
 and private institutional finance largely supplanted public sources in providing capital for 
railroad construction, mergers and acquisitions.  
 
While both equity (stock) and debt (bonds) supported the capital requirements of American railways 
throughout their history, by the first decade of the 20
th
 century bonds became the main instrument used 
to raise funds and much of that debt was held as an asset within the portfolios of large financial 
institutions. Table 1 shows that a larger amount of rail stock than bonds had been issued and was 
outstanding as of 1900 ($5.8 billion stock; $4.9 billion bonds). However, by the beginning of World War 
I, in 1914, bonded debt outstanding had increased by over 100%, to $10.1 billion, while equity capital 
had increased by less than 50%, to $8.7 billion. Greater reliance on bonds than stock to provide rail 
capital continued after World War I and up to the Great Depression. Table 1 also shows that the par 
value of outstanding stock increased only 8.8% between 1920 and 1929, from $9.1 billion to $9.9 
billion, while bonded debt rose almost 18.1%, or by $2 billion. On the eve of the Great Depression, the 
ratio of bonds to stock for railroads was 1.22.
21
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Rail Bonds
1                   % Rail Stocks
2     % Total Stock and Bonds Total Percentage
1900 4,932 45.7% 5,850 54.3% 10,782 100%
1901 5,210 47.3% 5,806 52.7% 11,016 100%
1902 5,837 49.2% 6,024 50.8% 11,861 100%
1903 6,276 50.5% 6,156 49.5% 12,432 100%
1904 6,528 50.7% 6,340 49.3% 12,868 100%
1905 6,977 51.6% 6,554 48.4% 13,531 100%
1906 7,440 52.2% 6,804 47.8% 14,244 100%
1907 7,825 51.5% 7,357 48.5% 15,182 100%
1908 8,222 52.7% 7,374 47.3% 15,596 100%
1909 8,676 53.0% 7,686 47.0% 16,362 100%
1910 9,055 52.7% 8,113 47.3% 17,168 100%
1911 9,189 52.0% 8,471 48.0% 17,660 100%
1912 9,507 52.4% 8,623 47.6% 18,130 100%
1913 9,802 53.2% 8,611 46.8% 18,413 100%
1914 10,054 53.7% 8,680 46.3% 18,734 100%
1915 10,258 53.3% 8,995 46.7% 19,253 100%
1916 10,385 53.4% 9,059 46.6% 19,444 100%
1917 10,381 52.7% 9,302 47.3% 19,683 100%
1918 10,389 53.4% 9,055 46.6% 19,444 100%
1919 10,349 53.2% 9,091 46.8% 19,440 100%
1920 10,334 53.1% 9,113 46.9% 19,447 100%
1921 10,474 53.6% 9,076 46.4% 19,550 100%
1922 10,573 53.6% 9,141 46.4% 19,714 100%
1923 10,842 54.0% 9,250 46.0% 20,092 100%
1924 11,114 54.0% 9,474 46.0% 20,588 100%
1925 11,785 55.3% 9,539 44.7% 21,324 100%
1926 11,813 55.5% 9,485 44.5% 21,298 100%
1927 11,950 55.3% 9,663 44.7% 21,613 100%
1928 12,216 55.4% 9,843 44.6% 22,059 100%
1929 12,225 55.2% 9,918 44.8% 22,143 100%
1930 12,349 55.1% 10,083 44.9% 22,432 100%
1931 12,768 55.9% 10,080 44.1% 22,848 100%
1932 12,812 55.9% 10,114 44.1% 22,926 100%
1933 12,600 55.5% 10,099 44.5% 22,699 100%
1934 12,430 55.3% 10,038 44.7% 22,468 100%
1935 12,408 55.3% 10,023 44.7% 22,431 100%
1936 12,212 54.9% 10,029 45.1% 22,241 100%
1937 12,261 54.8% 10,114 45.2% 22,375 100%
1938 12,169 54.7% 10,089 45.3% 22,258 100%
1939 11,978 54.3% 10,075 45.7% 22,053 100%
Nominal value, common and preferred stock outstanding.
Table 1
Composition of Capital Raised By Railroads, 1900-1939
2
Source: Commission, Interstate Commerce. “Statistics of Railways in the United States.” edited by Bureau of Statistics, 153:
Government Printing Office, 1942.
(in millions)
1
Source: Hickman, W.B. (1953), "The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing since 1900,"  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton. Table A-1, p. 252.
 Includes all types of outstanding rail bonds at par value.
 
 
 
Railways and their institutional investment sponsors had many sound reasons for using debt (bonds) 
more than equity (stock) to raise capital, but this choice would ultimately come back to haunt both 
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parties and play an important role in affecting structural change within the transport sector.
22
 Heavier 
reliance on bonds than stock to raise capital created high fixed interest payments for railroads and 
recurrent requirements to pay off principal as bonds matured. Since the timing of those interest and 
principal payments was fixed, rail corporations could not adjust their payments to match fluctuations in 
operating income that occurred due to broader economic changes, such as recessions. Thus, management 
was burdened with debt service payments over which they had little control. Stock, on the other hand, 
bore no such fixed financial burdens. When operating income faltered, management could cut dividends 
in order to strengthen their budgets, though they might be wary of losing investors if they took this 
step.
23
  
 
So, why did railroad management rely more heavily on debt (bonds) rather than on equity (stock) to 
raise capital and why did financial institutions encourage this behavior both by originating loans to 
railways and by holding a significant portion of those loans in their own portfolios? Some of the reasons 
are exogenous. For example, for insurance companies and savings banks, government regulations 
prohibited large equity holdings within their financial reserves.
24
  Also, foreign holders of U.S. rail 
securities, who provided significant amounts of capital to railroads,
25
 especially in the period before 
World War I, favored bonds because they valued their greater security (in the form of a lien on a 
company about which—from a long distance—they knew relatively little);26 carried a fixed return, could 
often be purchased at discount and redeemed on maturity at par and carried less risk than equities.
27
 
Also, the corporate policies of both rail corporations and their financial sponsors favored borrowing 
rather than sale of stock to avoid giving give greater corporate control to equity shareholders.
28
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Most importantly, institutional investors favored bonds because they afforded excellent opportunities for 
earning profits at a relatively low risk. During the early development of capital markets in the U.S., 
particularly after the Civil War, reducing perceived risk was crucial to attracting investment. This was 
more easily accomplished with bonds than stock since bonds were often guaranteed by government 
jurisdictions 
29
 and since an estimated 90% of bonds were backed by real assets.
30
 In addition, rail bonds 
were usually guaranteed by liens on railway real estate (land and terminals, for example) or rolling stock 
(engines and railcars), which provided security for lenders. Equipment trust obligations, through which 
railways bought rolling stock and locomotives via a lease-purchase agreement, with title to the 
equipment vested in a financial trustee until payments were completed, became a major type of loan 
made to railways in the early 20
th
 century. In the event of non-payment of debt service, the lenders knew 
that they could repossess and re-sell the physical assets to recoup their investment. As a result, on the 
eve of the Great Depression, these loans made up 9% of total funded debt for railways.
31
 
 
Even though bonds provided certain hedges against risk, railway finances were still subject to losses that 
occurred within the highly competitive environment of railway development, particularly the not 
infrequent recessions and depressions of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. This led many railways into  
bankruptcy. The average number of American railways in bankruptcy per year between 1894 and 1929 
(the eve of Great Depression) was 64. The largest number of bankruptcies was 192 in 1894, after the 
Panic of 1893 and depression of subsequent years; the lowest 26 in 1905, a period when U.S. railways 
were thriving financially.
32
 Surprisingly, however, when railroads entered bankruptcy, the financial and 
management reorganization that followed actually provided financial institutions with  both a hedge 
against bond losses and a source of fee income. This is a unique aspect of the financial history of 
American railroads. American bankruptcy proceedings were governed by the courts, not by state or 
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federal law, under a specialized judicial procedure called “equity receivership”33 in which railway 
ownership or its management representatives invited a bank—usually one which had previously raised 
funds for the railway—to serve as receiver of the insolvent property. Courts almost always agreed to 
appoint bank receivers, even though such an arrangement could be considered collusive.
34
 Then, railway 
owners and managers, bankers, and stock and bondholders negotiated arrangements to raise new capital, 
first, to pay off the maturing loans and pending interest payments that originally caused the bankruptcy; 
and second, to purchase new rolling stock and rebuild the often deteriorated infrastructure of the 
railway. In a typical reorganization agreement stockholders paid an assessment, in return for which they 
received newly issued stock in the company, while bondholders—mainly large financial institutions—
took losses on their devalued securities as new debt was issued. But, while the stockholders were usually 
left holding “watered” stock which might not bear dividends for a long time, if ever, bondholders held 
assets that usually gained in value when the reorganized company returned to profitability.
35
 In addition, 
financial institutions reaped large fees repackaging and re-selling the bonds that were issued as part of 
reorganization.
36
 In short, in most American rail bankruptcies equity capital (stock) was put at more risk 
than credit (bonds), and institutional creditors (bondholders) generally emerged in a stronger condition 
than stockholders. This adds further evidence to the proposition that financial institutions believed rail 
bonds were a worthwhile asset to hold in their portfolios.   
 
In sum, by the first decade of the 20
th
 century, rail bonds had become the gold standard of securities in 
the U.S. capital markets, which institutional investors favored over equity for a variety of reasons, 
including, first, the security those bonds offered through liens on the physical equipment of railroads; 
second, due to laws that forced insurance companies to invest mainly in bonds, which were considered 
safer than stocks; third, because the legal structure of equity receivership (bankruptcy) proceedings 
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included profit incentives to investors to issue bonds; and, finally, by raising capital through debt, rather 
than equity, railroad management could more readily limit shareholder influence. Thus, as railroads 
swept across the American landscape between the last quarter of the 19
th
 century and World War I, they 
did so with the support of banks, insurance and investment companies and trusts that issued rail bonds, 
which they stockpiled in their own asset portfolios. Though they also issued, purchased and profited 
from railway stock, the increase in rail debt relative to equity is the most important trend within rail 
capital finance history during this period.  
 
CHANGES IN PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION  
Between 1900 (the first date for which systematic data is available) and 1929, on eve of the Great 
Depression, financial institutions significantly increased their rail assets, though those decreased relative 
to other assets within their overall portfolios. Table 2 shows that, for all major financial institutions, 
holdings of rail securities increased from 1900 to 1912, just before World War I, and continued to 
increase even after the War, when competition from highway-based transport was beginning to cut 
seriously into freight and passenger revenues. Specifically, insurance companies increased their holdings 
of rail securities from $667 million in 1900 to almost $4 billion in 1929, equal to 18% of their 
investment assets (though down from almost 35% in 1900); savings banks increased their holdings from 
$420 million to $1.4 billion in 1929, or 14.5% of assets in rail bonds and stock (down from 18.5% in 
1900); commercial banks went from $520 million to $1.191 billion, or 2.2% of assets in 1929, down 
from 7.2% in 1900; and investment companies held 17% of assets in rail securities in 1929 (data not 
available for 1900). The decrease in rail assets as a percentage of overall institutional portfolios in 1929 
reflects diversification of institutional portfolios that accompanied American economic growth, not a 
decrease in confidence by banks and other institutional investors in railways. Instead, as the so-called 
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Second Industrial Revolution took hold in the U.S., with tremendous expansion in industries such as 
steel and public utilities, financial institutions added holdings in those sectors, resulting in a relative 
decline in their rail holdings.
37
 Thus, even as they diversified, Table 2 shows that, on the eve of the 
Great Depression in 1929, rail securities remained a major component of the investment portfolios of 
financial institutions: 12.9% as an average for all financial institutions and 16.5% if commercial banks 
are excluded.
38
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rail 
Securities
1
Total 
Assets
2
%
Rail 
Securities
1
Total 
Assets
2
%
Rail 
Securities
1
Total 
Assets
2
%
Rail 
Securities
1
Total 
Assets
2
%
Mutual Savings Banks 420 2,269 18.5% 771 3,797 20.3% 934 6,313 14.8% 1,375 9,472 14.5%
Commercial Banks 520 7,207 7.2% 929 16,468 5.6% 1,269 38,600 3.3% 1,191 53,718 2.2%
Insurance Companies 667 1,915 34.8% 1,745 5,182 33.7% 2,414 10,864 22.2% 3,929 21,890 17.9%
Trust Funds N/A 2,670 N/A N/A 6,090 N/A N/A 16,110 N/A N/A 27,600 N/A
Investment Companies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 90 16.7% 405 2,384 17.0%
Railroad Assets of Major Financial Institutions, 1900-1929
Table 3
(in millions)
1900 1912 1922 1929
1
Rail stocks and bonds
2
Total Assets includes agricultural loans; household mortgages; unincorporated business and corporate loans; corporate stocks and bonds; federal, state and local government securities; miscellaneous 
and foreign loans. These are same asset categories as in
Source: Goldsmith, R. (1958) Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. A-3, A-5, A-8, A-9, A-12, A-13, A-16, A-21
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The financial industry produced a number of reports in the years prior to the Great Depression 
and even into the early 1930‟s in which they justified their continued investment in rail 
securities, even though railroads faced a rise of competition from highway-based modes of 
transport. For example, a major policy study sponsored by commercial, savings and investment 
banks, life insurance companies and the endowments of elite universities such as Yale, Harvard 
and Columbia, argues that rail is an essential mode of transportation in the U.S. economy and 
defends the emphasis on rail bonds as an investment asset.
39
 While acknowledging that “a severe 
decline in the value of $19.5 billion of railroad obligations and shares has occasioned concern to 
institutions which hold such obligations among their assets…,”40 the report defends railways and 
argues for coordination between railways and other transport modes, “such as highway, water, 
rapid transit and air.”41 Similarly, a report by the American Bankers Association in the late 
1920‟s avers that the “potential capacity of the motor truck as a competitor of the railroad freight 
car, and the extent of actual encroachment upon railroad freight traffic, are not relatively 
great.”42 The bankers argue that “(b)ecause of their longer experience in transportation and their 
trained traffic organizations, the railroads should be able to develop and operate motor coach and 
freight truck service better than the new motor vehicle companies…”.43 They also believed that, 
while “auto is a major part of the U.S. economy…, it hardly seems probable that the degree of 
increase in motor vehicles in the next five years will be as great as the increase during the past 
five years.”44 They support railroad purchases of trucking companies that provide short haul 
services, which supplement the long haul advantages of rail.
45
 These are statements by 
institutional investors who do not appear overly worried about the challenges posed for railroads 
by highway-based transport.  
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However, countervailing evidence suggests that some money managers were concerned about 
competition from highway-based transport. A 1934 report by Joseph Eastman, the Federal 
Coordinator of Transportation, states that “a member of the Coordinator‟s staff interviewed 
numerous officers who have charge of the investment of large amounts of capital for insurance 
companies, banks, and like institutions, as well as large personal investors. He found that they 
are beset by fears with respect to railroad investments…. They fear the competition of motor 
trucks and other transportation agencies…and a host of other things (such as excessive regulation 
of railway rates).” 46 It is possible, therefore, that bankers and other large institutional investors 
recognized the threat of high-based transport to the underlying valuations of railway securities in 
their portfolios, but also believed that railway management was taking appropriate steps to 
control the deleterious effects of that competition.
47
    
 
In sum, in the period between 1900 and 1929, large financial institutions increased holdings of 
rail assets in their investment portfolios. They did so even in spite of significant competition 
from the automobile, truck and intercity bus. Both in their investment priorities and in public 
reports they fail to manifest significant concern about highway competition, even as the 
operating finances of railways deteriorated and as numerous railways entered bankruptcy 
proceedings. Partly this may have been because they saw railway corporate management 
responding to competition in appropriate ways. Partly, too, they had witnessed instability in rail 
finances for a long time, well back into the 19
th
 century, but had usually turned that instability to 
their own financial advantage through the equity receivership process. Furthermore, because they 
had diversified assets through investments in non-rail industries during the Second Industrial 
Revolution, their portfolios were somewhat hedged from risk and their portfolios generated 
strong profits throughout the 1920‟s.48 Most importantly, however, on the eve of the Great 
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Depression, rail securities composed around 15% of assets of all the major institutional groups 
except commercial banks, a heavy weighting in that single asset category--exposure that would  
cause significant problems when the financial crash occurred. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
As earnings declined after the onset of the Great Depression, as earnings declined many railroads 
became unable to meet interest charges and payments on maturing debt.
49
 Concommitantly, 
deflation in the value of railway debt contributed to instability in broader U.S. credit markets. 
This worried not just private bankers who held rail debt in their portfolios, but also officials in 
the Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations, as they tried to maintain the flow of credit in capital 
markets in the early years of the Depression. To deal with the credit crisis, President Hoover 
signed legislation near the end of his term in office in 1932 creating the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC). The RFC quickly became an influential force in the U.S. credit markets, 
acting as a public financial intermediary. Congress appropriated $4 billion and authorized the 
RFC to operate as a revolving loan fund so that, as loans were repaid, new debt could be issued 
without recourse to additional Congressional appropriations. Soon thereafter, newly elected 
President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Emergency Banking Act (March 9, 1933) and 
subsequent amendments (June 10, 1933), which gave the RFC additional powers, including 
authority to lend to financial institutions; to buy stock in banks and insurance companies; to buy 
stock in private corporations, including railroads, and use its equity position to influence 
corporate policy; to issue bonds that used assets, such as railcars, as collateral; and to provide 
funds to government agencies that, in turn, could lend to public and private organizations, 
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including railways.
50
 In short, the RFC had the power to intervene in both financial markets and 
corporate boardrooms. 
 
The first government agency of its kind in American financial history, the RFC‟s influence on 
railway finances were particularly significant. It loaned over $200 million to railroads in the first 
year of its existence
51
 and then, from 1933 to 1940, loaned an additional $704 million, for total 
credits of close to one billion dollars before World War II.
52
 The types of credit extended by the 
RFC to railways varied according to both its evolving legislative mandates and changes in 
economic conditions. From 1932 to 1934, as Table 3 shows, 92.9% of RFC‟s rail credit activity 
involved direct loans to railroads. Comparable to the short term loans of a commercial bank, 
direct loans provided funds so that railroads could pay recurring interest charges and maturing 
principal on bonds that would otherwise have gone into default. Then, in 1935, after Congress 
gave it additional powers to directly purchase corporate securities, the RFC shifted its priorities 
to refinancing rail bonds. Through that mechanism, it purchased existing rail debt held by private 
financial institutions, usually at par (full) value, not the deflated values they were selling for in 
Depression-era bond markets. The RFC then issued new loans directly to the railroads at 
discounted interest rates, thereby lowering railway debt service charges and improving their 
chances of remaining solvent. This served the dual function of strengthening the balance sheets 
of railways and of their private creditors. As shown in Table 3, from November, 1934 through 
October, 1936, 76.9% of RFC loans were for “purchases of securities,” which means refinancing 
transactions. Then, in the last three years of the Depression, from late 1936 through October, 
1939, 46.3% of RFC loans were for “retirement of bonds,” meaning bonds were redeemed before 
maturity. These also were largely refinancing transactions that resulted from improved economic 
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conditions. Rail operating income increased significantly in 1936 and early 1937, and again in 
1939, which allowed railroads to trade in more costly bank and other private debt for RFC bonds 
bearing lower interest rates.
53
 In short, through direct loans, refinancing and retirement of 
existing bonded debt, the RFC relieved private financial institutions of a significant proportion of 
their holdings of deflated assets, removing those institutions in significant measure from their 
historic position as primary suppliers of external capital to railways and substituting the 
American government as the railway‟s main creditor.  
Jan. 22, 1932-
Oct. 31, 1934
% Nov. 1, 1934-
Oct. 31, 1936
%
Nov. 1, 1936-
Oct. 31, 1939
%
Direct Loans
1 482,274,313 92.9% 24,235,548 13.4% 47,928,459 44.0%
Purchases of Securities
2
N/A N/A 143,606,450 79.6% 9,300,000 8.5%
Retirement of Bonds
3
N/A N/A 12,405,667 6.9% 50,391,971 46.3%
Miscellaneous
4
37,089,782 7.1% 274,200 0.2% 1,205,875 1.1%
TOTAL 519,364,095 100% 180,521,865 100% 108,826,305 100%
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission. "Annual Reports." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932-1939.1932-1939. These figures were validated
through primary research with Quarterly Financial Reports of the RFC found in Record Group 237, Archive II, National Archives, Rockville, Maryland.
1
Direct Loans includes payment of bond and other securities' interest charges; payment of principal on debentures and equipment trust certificates. 
2
Purchases of Securities includes purchase of carriers' loans (some stock), purchase of stock of subsidiary company and purchase of lessor properties.
3
The Retirement of Bonds means a bond issue was redeemed before its maturity date.
4
Miscellaneous includes rentals, preferential claims and judgments.
Table 3
Amount and Purposes of Authorized RFC Loans to Railroads, 1932-1939
 
 
The RFC‟s interventions in private capital markets during the 1930‟s represent a watershed in the 
financial history of American railroads, the effects of which are reflected in Table 4, showing 
changes in the composition of assets in the portfolios of financial institutions between 1929 and 
1939.  
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Amount % Amount % Amount %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans 19,518 36.3% 8,032 25.4% 8,004 19.5%
Corporate and other Business Loans 21,668 40.3% 9,473 29.9% 9,761 23.8%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds 1,191 2.2% 1,052 3.3% 946 2.3%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds 4,628 8.6% 2,910 9.2% 2,535 6.2%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 6,713 12.5% 10,195 32.2% 19,723 48.1%
Total 53,718 100% 31,662 100% 40,969 100%
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans 4,603 48.6% 4,665 47.4% 4,075 39.5%
Corporate and other Business Loans 1,333 14.1% 1,174 11.9% 1,003 9.7%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds 1,375 14.5% 1,435 14.6% 792 7.7%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds 720 7.6% 819 8.3% 714 6.9%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 1,441 15.2% 1,743 17.7% 3,722 36.1%
Total 9,472 100% 9,836 100% 10,306 100%
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans 9,091 41.5% 9,975 43.2% 8,622 27.5%
Corporate and other Business Loans 2,708 12.4% 2,620 11.3% 2,366 7.6%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds 3,929 17.9% 3,614 15.6% 3,372 10.8%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds 3,873 17.7% 3,970 17.2% 7,748 24.7%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 2,289 10.5% 2,934 12.7% 9,229 29.5%
Total 21,890 100% 23,113 100% 31,337 100%
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans 20 0.8% 23 2.0% 88 6.0%
Corporate and other Business Loans 13 0.5% 15 1.3% 12 0.8%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds 405 17.0% 137 11.9% 170 11.6%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds 1,918 80.5% 965 83.8% 1,173 80.0%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 28 1.2% 11 1.0% 24 1.6%
Total 2,384 100% 1,151 100% 1,467 100%
Amount % Amount % Amount %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans 3,730 13.5% 3,190 13.9% 3,690 11.6%
Corporate and other Business Loans 620 2.2% 560 2.4% 510 1.6%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds 19,350 70.1% 13,000 56.5% 19,950 62.6%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 3,900 14.1% 6,250 27.2% 7,700 24.2%
Total 27,600 100% 23,000 100% 31,850 100%
Grand Total 115,064 88,762 115,929
Source: Goldsmith, R. Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1953. (Table A-3, A-5, A-8, A-9, A-12, A-13, A-16, A-21)
Trust Funds
1929 1933 1939
Insurance Companies
1929 1933 1939
Investment Companies
1929 1933 1939
Mutual Savings Banks
1929 1933 1939
Table 4
Asset Allocations of Major Financial Institutions, 1929-1939
(in millions)
1929 1933 1939
Commercial Banks
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Most importantly, this table shows that all major classes of financial institutions significantly 
reduced both the absolute amount and relative size of rail stocks and bonds in their portfolios 
during this ten year period. Savings banks reduced their rail assets by almost half, from 14.5% to 
7.7% ($1.375 billion to 792 million). Insurance companies reduced their rail holdings from 
almost 18% of overall portfolio assets to just less than 11% ($3.929 billion to $3.372 billion). 
Investment company rail assets went from 17% to 11.6% ($405 million to $170 million). 
Commercial banks increased their percentage holdings of rail assets by a very small amount, 
from 2.2% to 2.3%, but the absolute level of those assets decreased from $1.191 billion to $946 
million. Furthermore, as previously noted, these figures significantly understate the amount of 
reallocation within institutional portfolios both because data in Goldsmith‟s “trust funds” 
category is not broken out for rail versus other sectors and because private investment banks did 
not disclose their stock and bond assets, so they are not included in Goldsmith‟s tables. However, 
the evidence is clear that both trust funds and investment banks were heavily invested in rail 
securities in the early 20
th
 Century, then divested from them during the Great Depression.
54
 Thus, 
divestment from rail securities was broad based, deep and reached across all sectors of American 
institutional finance.   
 
At the same time as they eliminated rail securities from their portfolios, financial institutions 
dramatically increased their investment in federal, state and local government securities, which 
protected them from deflation or bankruptcy risk. Table 4 shows that, between 1929 and 1939, 
government securities rose from 12.5% to 48.1% of commercial bank portfolios ($6.713 billion 
to $19.723 billion); from 15.2% to 36.1% of savings bank assets ($1.441 billion to $3.722 
billion); from 10.5% to 29.5% for insurance companies ($2.289 billion to $9.229); and from 
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14.1% to 24.2% for institutional trusts ($3.9 billion to $7.7 billion). Based on Carosso‟s research, 
I infer that investment banks took similar steps. Thus, just as the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation was socializing rail securities and becoming a major public creditor for railways—
thereby allowing financial institutions to remove devalued assets from their portfolios—those 
same private financial institutions were moving their freed-up capital into government securities. 
They fled from rail to the safety of government bonds. 
 
The shift of assets by financial institutions into government securities was more pronounced for 
rail than for other sectors. Table 5 shows that, during the Great Depression, the two classes of 
financial institutions holding the largest percentage of rail securities—savings banks and 
insurance companies—divested of rail assets at a more rapid rate than they did in comparable 
sectors, such as public utilities and other corporate loans. This is also true for investment 
companies, though for these companies the percentage change differences are less pronounced. It 
is not the case for commercial banks, but these banks were never major lenders to railways. 
Thus, financial institutions did not divest from their various asset classes equally during the 
Great Depression in order to move into safe government securities. Instead, with assistance from 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, they divested more rapidly from rail than other 
sectors.
55
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1929 1939 % Change 1929 1939 % Change 1929 1939 % Change 1929 1939 % Change
Railroad Stocks and Bonds 1,191 946 -20.57% 1,375 792 -42.40% 3,929 3,372 -14.18% 405 170 -58.02%
Public Utilities 1,382 790 -42.84% 525 517 -1.52% 2,230 4,579 105.34% 301 128 -57.48%
Other Corporate Loans  16,243 8,341 -48.65% 1,011 873 -13.65% 3,391 4,622 36.30% 1,630 1,057 -35.15%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 6,713 19,723 193.80% 1,441 3,722 158.29% 2,289 9,229 303.19% 28 24 -14.29%
Total 25,529 29,800 4,352 5,904 11,839 21,802 2,364 1,379
Table 5
Source: Goldsmith, R. (1958), "Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900" , Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Table A-3, A-5, A-8, A-9, A-12, A-13, A-21
Divestment by Financial Institutions (in millions), 1929-1939
Investment CompaniesCommercial Banks Mutual Savings Banks Insurance Companies
 
 
Yet, arguably, rail assets were not so large that they threatened the overall viability of large 
institutions. Writing about this issue, C.M. Clay, Chief Counsel for the RFC, suggested that, 
“due to several intermediate rises in bond prices since 1932, opportunities have been afforded for 
(bond)holders to weed out their more risky bonds with a minimum of loss….”56 Clay also 
maintained that “the (financial) position of… insurance companies and savings banks…is 
generally sound….”57 This contradicts the notion that banks, insurance companies, investment 
trusts, university endowments and other institutional investors were threatened with insolvency 
because of the rail debt they held in their portfolios. Instead, it is equally plausible that, though it 
might have cut into their profits, they could have continued to hold those securities during the 
1930‟s without seriously jeopardizing their overall financial viability and/or could have slowly 
divested themselves of those holdings as market conditions improved--and conditions did 
improve at various times during the 1930‟s and 1940‟s.  
 
When all is said and done, however, even if they had not divested, private institutions were 
unlikely to have provided additional loans to railways in the 1930‟s because their existing rail 
holdings had suffered serious deflation in value. Thus, the discounted loans provided by the 
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Reconstruction Finance Corporation were crucial for avoiding wholesale bankruptcy within the 
rail sector during the Great Depression. Federal loans during the Depression shored up the 
finances of insolvent railroads, which concommitantly attenuated the effects of the Depression 
on the broader U.S. economy. At the same time RFC refinancing transactions relieved financial 
institutions of deflated rail bonds, even though arguably those bonds did not seriously threaten 
their balance sheets. In essence, the American government subsidized the finances of private 
institutions in order to avoid massive bankruptcy in the rail sector.  
 
The interventions of the RFC were unique in American financial history up to that time. Never 
before had the American government so directly and massively influenced private capital 
markets. While the government had previously issued treasury bonds to pay for deficits resulting 
from the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Civil War, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation intervened in capital markets in the 1930‟s more directly, using a wider range of 
financial tools, and on a larger scale than ever before. During the Great Depression, the RFC 
became a national investment bank with immense capital resources and no reserve requirements 
that backed its credit with the government guarantees. It directly took over assets that banks, 
trusts, institutional endowments, insurance and investment companies were anxious to shed, 
including, notably, seriously devalued railway debt, and simultaneously financed depression-
induced federal government deficits. These unprecedented initiatives represent the beginning of 
the modern era of the U.S. government acting as public financial intermediary.  
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POLITICS AND FINANCE  
While this article focuses on the rail industry‟s access to capital, financial issues cannot be 
separated entirely from political developments that affected transport in the inter-war period.
58
 
Some of these are particularly relevant to the decline of rail, beginning with problems railways 
experienced in dealing with regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). In the 
U.S. the ICC was at the center of transportation policy from its creation in 1887 through the 
1930‟s. During these years the ICC‟s purview included rate setting for railways and interstate 
commerce on highways; oversight of rail mergers and acquisitions; issuance of rail securities; 
and advising both Congress and presidential administrations concerning transportation policy. 
However, particularly during the period between the end of the Civil War (1865) and 1900, the 
ICC was less powerful than private corporations, particularly large banks, insurance companies 
and other institutions of finance capital, in terms of determining the shape of transportation 
development.
59
 During that time, J.P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn Loeb, Lehman Brothers, and 
powerful railway corporations such as those controlled by Vanderbilt, Van Sweringen and Hill, 
shaped the mergers and consolidations that swept the rail industry.
60
 Since ICC power over these 
mergers was weak, it was unable to eliminate the duplication of lines and overbuilding that often 
occurred.
61
 Then, after 1900, the ICC faced a new problem--balancing competition between rail 
and motorized transport. Before it could do anything about this, however, the demands of 
supplying troops and allied nations during World War I caused Congress to pass the Emergency 
Railway Act of 1917, under which railways were leased to and operated by a new public agency, 
the Federal Railway Administration. This set a precedent for direct government control of 
railways and could have been used to bolster the ICC‟s power after the war‟s end. Instead, 
Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, which mandated that the ICC develop plans for 
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consolidation of railroads, but failed to provide the agency with effective powers to enforce 
consolidation plans and also left a legal loophole whereby rail holding companies could avoid 
regulatory approval for mergers.
62
 Thus, even as the ICC developed a series of consolidation 
proposals during the 1920‟s, rail holding companies continued to pursue mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, the Van Sweringen brothers added to their railway conglomerate in 
the East and Midwest while Vanderbilt‟s New York Central railways and the Pennsylvania Rail 
Corporation pursued their own acquisitions and mergers.
63
 Partly undertaken as competitive 
moves against neighboring railways, these mergers often involved large, speculative 
investments, financed by issuance of stock and by new borrowing, the latter often at high interest 
rates. As a result, while some consolidation of railways occurred during the 1920‟s,  these 
privately organized mergers failed to overcome the problem of duplication of lines, failed to 
increase the efficiency of rail transport in relation to highway-based competition, and increased 
the debt of railways at the worst possible time, just before the Great Depression.
64
 Thus, by the 
end of the 1920‟s the rail industry in the United States was internally divided; had not overcome 
inefficiencies from duplication of lines; and was losing passenger and freight revenues to 
competition from highway-based transport—all just as their finances were seriously weakened 
by excessive debt. 
  
In order to effectively and efficiently compete with the growth of highway based traffic, the rail 
system required rationalization—elimination of overlapping rail lines, combining weak with 
strong companies, and system-wide consolidation to increase efficiency.
65
 Thus, early in his first 
term, President Roosevelt supported passage of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act 
(June 16, 1933) creating the Office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, which was 
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empowered to investigate, recommend and, if necessary, require changes to the U.S. 
transportation system.  Appointed as head of this new office, Joseph Eastman, who was also an 
ICC Commissioner, urged consolidation and financial reorganization of railroads in order to 
make them competitive with highway-based transportation.
66
 Based partly on Eastman‟s 
recommendations, the Roosevelt Administration submitted numerous bills to Congress during 
the 1930‟s dealing with rationalization of the planning, financing and re-structuring of the 
country‟s transportation system and Congress itself held numerous hearings and proposed laws, 
one of which called for full nationalization of railways.
67
  While some important legislation was 
enacted, aspects of the new laws actually weakened railway finances. First, amendments to the 
railway equity receivership law, passed by Congress in 1933 and 1935, reduced the power of 
financial institutions to unilaterally control bankruptcy proceedings, which thereby increased the 
motivation of financial institutions to withdraw from rail capital markets since they could no 
longer manipulate reorganization to achieve financial gain.
68
 Second, the Banking Act of 1933 
(Glass Steagull), ordered commercial banks to withdraw their deposits from investment banks.
69
 
Because these deposits had been used as a source of loans, railways lost another potential source 
of capital. Third, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 gave the ICC regulatory power over all motor 
carriers engaged in interstate commerce, but did not tie that to broader rationalization of 
competition within the transportation industry.
70
 Finally, the Transportation Act of 1940 
supported a national transportation system that embraced rail, motor and water modes, but the 
Act provided no effective power to the government to implement such a system, so the 
competitive position of rail was not ameliorated.
71
 Thus, taking all this legislation into account,  
by the end of the Great Depression American railways were no better off in terms of access to 
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capital and competitive balance with motorized transport than they had been at the beginning of 
the 1930‟s.   
 
In addition to legislative change, President Roosevelt could have taken executive actions to 
improve railway finances. He and his Coordinator of Transportation could have used their 
numerous points of leverage over the rail industry to force at least consolidation, if not the full 
nationalization plans that Eastman initially proposed.
72
 The Transportation Act of 1934 stated 
that the Coordinator‟s Office could, if necessary, “… require action on the part of the (rail) 
carriers...which will avoid unnecessary duplication of services and facilities…”.73 But Eastman 
was “tentative,…doubtful, hesitant, and elaborately cautious,” according to one major study of 
his term as Coordinator,
74
 so he forced no change on the railway industry. Roosevelt was 
similarly cautious. At a time when both railways and their institutional creditors were in 
desperate need of support, Roosevelt could have used the RFC‟s control of large amounts of 
capital and credit to force railroads to accept consolidation, reorganization and rationalization of 
their services.
75
 Instead, he and the RFC allowed railroads to continue to operate a system 
weakened by duplication of lines and services and other inefficiencies which allowed cars, buses 
and trucks to make competitive inroads. In short, Roosevelt and his appointees failed to use their 
political, economic and financial powers to address the underlying structural weaknesses of the 
railroad industry. Neither executive actions taken, nor new legislation passed in the 1930‟s was 
sufficient to create a transportation system in which railroads could compete effectively with 
cars, buses and trucks. Thus the rail industry began a long period of decline--interrupted only by 
an ephemeral revival during World War II--and highway based transport continued its rise 
towards dominating American transport.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
In theoretical terms, the way public and private financial intervention in capital markets affected 
the shift from rail to highway dominance in American transport is representative of the process 
by which structural change normally occurs within economic sectors in the United States. Private 
institutions, not government planning, largely control credit allocation in the U.S.,
76
 which is a 
version of Keynesian liberal economics, sometimes termed “corporate capitalism”77 or a “capital 
market based system.”78 This type of system operated in the U.S. from the late 19th century 
through the 1930‟s, as banks, insurance companies and other large institutional investors 
supported railway capital needs, even in the face of growing competition from highway-based 
transport. On the eve of the Great Depression in 1929, insurance companies held 18% of their 
corporate assets in rail; savings banks, 14.5%; and investment companies, 17%. But, as 
depreciation eroded the value of those assets in the 1930‟s, financial institutions divested from 
rail, removing themselves from their historic position both as financial intermediaries in rail 
capital markets and as major purchasers of rail securities for their own asset portfolios. This 
created a significant precondition for structural change because railroads lost access to external, 
private capital. Furthermore, auto, bus and truck producers relied largely on internally generated 
profits to produce their vehicles, so were not as dependent as railways on external financing for 
growth.
79
 So, while railroads faced loss of access to external capital in the 1930‟s, this was not a 
problem for their highway-based competitors.  
 
The withdrawal of private capital from railway finance was facilitated by the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, a powerful new public financial intermediary created during the Great 
Depression to restore liquidity to frozen American credit markets. The RFC purchased devalued 
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rail assets and thereby assumed the role of public creditor to railways. However, the RFC did not 
use its takeover of railway credit to force changes in the competitive landscape of American 
transport. The Office of Transportation Coordinator did not intervene to force either elimination 
of duplicative railway lines or corporate consolidations that could increase efficiency in the 
industry. As had been the case throughout the prior financial history of the United States, even 
during the crisis of the Great Depression, when the government had a momentous opportunity to 
force structural change in the transport sector, private rail and highway corporations continued to 
make the decisions that determined their own fate. Private planning, not public intervention, 
continued to determine the structure of American transport. While highway transport did not 
become completely dominant in the U.S. transportation sector until the 1950‟s and 1960‟s, the 
interplay of private financial institutions and the federal government in capital markets in the 
1930‟s established significant financial preconditions for that subsequent shift.80  
 
But, one could ask of those financial institutions that divested from rail securities in the 1930‟s: 
weren‟t they just reacting to shifts towards highway transport that had already commenced 
around the time of World War I? Weren‟t they just avoiding losses and pursuing profits in a 
rational manner? On the contrary, my argument is that these institutions did not react to the 
emerging structural shift towards highway transport in a timely manner. In their published 
reports in the 1920‟s, they gave various reasons why they did not see highway modes as a major 
threat to railways, not least because railway management was taking initiatives to diversify and 
merge with trucking and bus companies. As a result they stayed strongly invested in rail into the 
early years of the Great Depression. Even if one accepts that financial institutions were just slow 
to react to highway competition and that divestiture in the 1930‟s was a belated way of avoiding 
 31 
losses and pursuing profits elsewhere, once they began to divest, they were making decisions that 
contributed to the decline of rail. This is because, as noted earlier, access to credit in the U.S. is 
controlled by private markets. In fact, whether institutional investors were just slow to react or  
whether they were reactive or proactive at all is not the point. The point is that divestment denied 
railways access to needed capital and left them dependent on public credit. In the context of the 
American market-based system, where government did not use its executive powers to force 
structural economic change, railroads were left at a serious disadvantage relative to their 
highway competitors.   
 
Alternatively, one could argue that the more deep rooted cause of railroad decline was loss of 
competitiveness with highway transport, not divestiture from rail assets by private capital, due 
either to inflexible regulation of freight and passenger rates by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission 
81
 and/or to poorly conceived decisions by railway management concerning how to 
cope with highway competition.
82
 However, as proponents of the inflexible rate thesis concede, 
regulation by itself did not inevitably doom railways to failure
83
 and highway hegemony was not 
an inevitable outcome of management failures.
84
 On both counts, if railways had eliminated 
duplicative lines and consolidated overlapping corporate jurisdictions through mergers, and/or if 
the government had forced consolidation of rail services to bring efficiency to the overall 
industry, railroads might have more effectively competed with highway-based modes of 
transport. These were not purely hypothetical alternatives. They were contingent options very 
much under active consideration by railways and government in that historical time period.
85
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Thus, the central thesis of this paper is not contradicted by counterfactual arguments. The 
evidence remains clear that, when the Roosevelt Administration, through the vehicle of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, relieved railroads of much of their devalued debt and 
facilitated the redistribution of assets within the portfolios of large financial institutions in the 
1930‟s, it could also have used its considerable political, regulatory and financial powers to force 
railroads to consolidate, reorganize and rationalize service. But, because the American political 
economy is not based on an interventionist state, these steps were not taken. As a result, by the 
end of the Great Depression American railways had lost much of their financial strength and 
economic competitiveness with highway-based modes. This allowed the motorized transport 
industry to move towards establishing its dominance within American transport, a position it 
would consolidate not long after the end of World War II.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
American Bankers Association. "Automotive Transportation and Railroads: A Study of 
Relationships." New York City, N.Y., 1927. 
 33 
Baskin, J.B. "The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 
1600-1914: Overcoming Asymmetric Information." The Business History Review 62, no. 
2 (1988): 199-237. 
Bernheim, A., and M. Schneider, eds. The Security Markets. New York City: Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1935. 
Bordo, M., ed. The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the 
20th Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Campbell, E.G. The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893-1900 New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1938. 
Carosso, V. A History of Investment Banking in America. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1970. 
Chandler, A. The Railroads--the Nation's First Big Business. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1965. 
Churella, A. "Company, State, and Region: Three Approaches to Railroad History " Enterprise 
and Society 7, no. 3 (2006): 581-91. 
Clay, C.M. What Shall We Do About the Railroads. Washington, D.C.: Ransdell, 1939. 
Cochran, Thomas C. Railroad Leaders. New York: Russell and Russell, 1965. 
Commission, Interstate Commerce. "Statistics of Railways in the United States." edited by 
Bureau of Statistics, 153: Government Printing Office, 1942. 
Edwards, G.W. The Evolution of Finance Capitalism. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1938. 
Eichengreen, B. "U.S. Foreign Financial Relations in the Twentieth Century." In Cambridge 
Economic History of the United States, edited by S. Engerman and R. Gallman. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Fuess, Claude. Joseph B. Eastman: Servant of the People 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. 
Goddard, S. Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road and Rail. New York: Basic Books, 
1994. 
Goldsmith, R. Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1958. 
Goodrich, C. . Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1960. 
Greenberg, D. Financiers and Railroads, 1869-1889. Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware 
Press, 1980. 
Hansen, B. "The People's Welfare and the Origins of Corporate Reorganization: The Wabash 
Receivership Reconsidered " The Business History Review 74, no. 3 (2000): 377-405. 
Interstate Commerce Commission. "Annual Reports." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1932-1939. 
Jones, J.H. Fifty Billion Dollars. New York: Macmillan, 1951. 
Kerr, K. A. American Railroad Politics, 1914-1920: Rates, Wages and Efficiency. Pittsburgh: 
Carnegie Mellon, 1968. 
Kotz, D. Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1978. 
Larson, J. Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular 
Government in the Early United States. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001. 
 34 
Latham, E. The Politics of Railroad Coordination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959 
 
Lowenthal, M. "The Railroad Reorganization Act." Harvard Law Review 47 (1933): 18-58. 
Martin, A. Enterprise Denied. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 
———. Railroads Triumphant. New York: Oxford, 1992. 
Mason, J. "Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Financial Intermediaries and 
Commerical and Industrial Enterprises in the U.S., 1932-1937." In Resolution of 
Financial Distress, edited by S.  Claessens, 167-204. Washington: The World Bank, 
2002. 
Mertins, H. National Transportation Policy in Transition. Toronto: D.C. Heath  1972. 
Moore, William. The Reorganization of Railroad Corporations. Washington, D.C.: American 
Council on Public Affairs, 1941. 
Moulton, H., ed. The American Transportation Problem. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1933. 
Nelson, James C. Railroad Transportation and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 
1959. 
O'Sullivan, M. "The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885-1930: Historical Facts and 
Theoretical Fashions." Enterprise and Society (2007): 1-53. 
Olson, J. S. Saving Capitalism: The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New Deal, 
1933-1940. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Orren, K. Coporate Power and Social Change. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974. 
Rae, John. The Road and Car in American Life. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971. 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. "Monthly Reports." Washington, D.C.: Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, 1932-1940. 
———. "Quarterly Report." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932. 
Revell, K. Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Pubic Policy in New York City, 1898-1938 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2003. 
Rose, M., Seely, B., Barrett, P. The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, 
Airlines and American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century. Columbus, OH: Ohio 
State University Press, 2006. 
Roy, W. Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Saunders, R. Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois 
Press, 2001. 
Schiffman, D. "Shattered Rails, Ruined Credit." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia, 2000. 
Simon, N. "The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States: 1890-1939." American 
Economic Review 88, no. 5 (1998): 1077-93. 
Skeel, D. Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001. 
Stover, J. American Railroads. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. 
Summers, H.B., Summers, R.E., eds. The Railroad Problem: With Reference to Government 
Ownership. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1939. 
Thompson, G. The Passenger Train in the Motor Age. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1993  
 35 
Transportation, Federal Coordinator of. "Is There Need for a Radical or Major Change in the 
Organization, Conduct and Regulation of the Railroad Industry Which Can Be 
Accomplished by Federal Legislation." edited by Committee on Interstate Commerce: US 
Government Printing Office, 1934. 
Veenendaal, A. Slow Train to Paradise: How Dutch Investment Helped Build American 
Railroads. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 
White, E. "Banking and Finance in the 20th Century." In The Cambridge Economic History of 
the United States, edited by S. Engerman, R. Gallman. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
———. "The Merger Movement in Banking." Journal of Economic History XLV, no. 2 (1985). 
Wilkens, M. The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Wilner, F. "Railroads and the Marketplace." Washington, D.C.: Association of American 
Railroads, 1987. 
Zysman, John. Government, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of 
Industrial Change. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 R. Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1958). See Tables A-3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 21. 
 
2
 A. Martin, Enterprise Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). viii. Other works in this vein include: 
K. A. Kerr, American Railroad Politics, 1914-1920: Rates, Wages and Efficiency (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon, 
1968). R. Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970 (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois Press, 
2001). 
 
3
 G. Thompson, The Passenger Train in the Motor Age (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993 ). Thomas C. 
Cochran, Railroad Leaders (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965).  
 
4
 The very large number of studies of individual railroads and their financial backers, and the lesser number of 
regional and national studies, provide relevant background for the pre-World War I period addressed in this article. 
Among the main works I rely upon are J. Stover, American Railroads (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). 
E.G. Campbell, The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893-1900 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1938). D. Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1978). A. Martin, Railroads Triumphant (New York: Oxford, 1992). Saunders, Merging Lines: 
American Railroads, 1900-1970. An excellent review of this and the broader railway literature is provided by A. 
Churella, "Company, State, and Region: Three Approaches to Railroad History " Enterprise and Society 7, no. 3 
(2006). 
 
5
 V. Carosso, A History of Investment Banking in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
 
6
 Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900. 
 
7
 Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States. 
 
8
 E. White, "The Merger Movement in Banking," Journal of Economic History XLV, no. 2 (1985). N. Simon, "The 
Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States: 1890-1939," American Economic Review 88, no. 5 (1998). M. 
O'Sullivan, "The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885-1930: Historical Facts and Theoretical Fashions," 
Enterprise and Society  (2007). K. Orren, Coporate Power and Social Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974). 
 
 36 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 J. S. Olson, Saving Capitalism: The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New Deal, 1933-1940 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). D. Schiffman, "Shattered Rails, Ruined Credit" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Columbia, 2000). J. Mason, "Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Financial 
Intermediaries and Commerical and Industrial Enterprises in the U.S., 1932-1937," in Resolution of Financial 
Distress, ed. S.  Claessens (Washington: The World Bank, 2002). 
 
10
 M. Rose, Seely, B., Barrett, P., The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines and 
American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2006). H. Mertins, 
National Transportation Policy in Transition (Toronto: D.C. Heath  1972). {Latham, 1959 
 #116}  
 
11
 M. Bordo, ed., The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the 20th Century 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 
12
 The main focus of Goldsmith‟s monograph is on the historical development of capital formation in all economic 
sectors of the United States in the first half of the 20
th
 Century.  
 
13
 Carosso, A History of Investment Banking in America.  Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United 
States. See also: G.W. Edwards, The Evolution of Finance Capitalism (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 
1938). 
 
14
 Carosso, A History of Investment Banking in America. Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United 
States. 
 
15
 The records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation are part of the National Archives of the United States. 
RFC documents are found in Archive II, located in College Park, Maryland. The primary Record Group for RFC 
documents in RG 237. 
 
16
 Interstate Commerce Commission, “Statistics of Railways in the United States,” ed. Bureau of Statstics (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, various years). 
 
17
 These are referenced at relevant points in the article. 
 
18
 These are referenced at relevant points in the article. 
 
19
 C.  Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1960), W. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). Goldsmith notes that railroads relied considerably more on 
external finance than did manufacturing corporations in the same period. Manufacturers relied primarily on 
reinvestment of profits, or internal financing. Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 
1900. 7-10. 
 
20
 Roy, Socializing Capital. 
 
21
 Wilkens shows that a significant amount of U.S. rail debt and equity was held by foreigners, mostly foreign 
financial institutions, but avers that “the course of foreign investment in U.S. railroads, 1875-1914, was highly 
erratic.” She estimates $4.2 billion in long term foreign investment in railroads in 1914, which, based on 
Goldsmith‟s figures shown in Table 1, would mean 22.4% of total rail securities were held by foreigners on the eve 
of World War I. M. Wilkens, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 193-94.  See also B. Eichengreen, "U.S. Foreign Financial Relations in the Twentieth 
Century," in Cambridge Economic History of the United States, ed. S. Engerman and R. Gallman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
22
 The growth trends for rail stock and bonds are consistent with broader trends in the development of capital finance 
in the U.S. During the first four decades of the 20th Century, the major types of private financial institutions—
 37 
                                                                                                                                                             
commercial and savings banks, investment banks, insurance companies, investment companies and private trusts—
increased their assets by over 800%, from $14.1 billion in 1900 to over $115 billion in 1929. Throughout this period 
of growth, financial institutions consistently held between 15% and 20% of their portfolios in corporate bonds, with 
somewhat less than that in stock. See A. Bernheim and M. Schneider, eds., The Security Markets (New York City: 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1935). 149 The stocks and bonds of railroads formed a significant percentage of this 
overall portfolio of assets. As of 1900, 7.2% of commercial bank assets were in rail bonds and stock; 18.5% for 
savings banks; 34.8% for insurance companies. See Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy 
since 1900. Appendix Tables A-3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 21. Regrettably the data set from which these numbers derive 
do not provide a uniform, detailed breakdown of stock compared to bond holdings by financial institutions. 
However, Goldsmith indicates that most of the rail assets held by financial institutions were bonded debt and only a 
relatively small amount was in stock.   
 
23
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for adding the caveat about possible loss of investor confidence. 
 
24
 Bernheim and Schneider, eds., The Security Markets. 149. 
 
25
 Two of the most important works in this regard are: A. Veenendaal, Slow Train to Paradise: How Dutch 
Investment Helped Build American Railroads (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). and Wilkens, The History 
of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914. 
 
26
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
 
27
 Wilkens, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914, 191. Eichengreen, "U.S. Foreign 
Financial Relations in the Twentieth Century." 
  
28
 D. Greenberg, Financiers and Railroads, 1869-1889 (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 1980), 
216-17, Schiffman, "Shattered Rails, Ruined Credit", 32. 
   
29
 On this particular point, see: J. Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular 
Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).  
Also Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890.  
 
30
 J.B. Baskin, "The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: 
Overcoming Asymmetric Information," The Business History Review 62, no. 2 (1988): 215.   
 
31
 H. Moulton, ed., The American Transportation Problem (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1933). 277 
  
32
  Interstate Commerce Commission, "Statistics of Railways in the United States," ed. Bureau of Statistics 
(Government Printing Office, 1942).  
 
33
 Non-rail corporations were governed by other state and federal bankruptcy laws. See D. Skeel, Debt's Dominion: 
A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
 
34
 Skeel notes that, in the vast majority of receiverships in the late 1800‟s, “insiders” were appointed as receivers. 
Ibid. See also M. Lowenthal, "The Railroad Reorganization Act," Harvard Law Review 47 (1933). 
 
35
 B. Hansen, "The People's Welfare and the Origins of Corporate Reorganization: The Wabash Receivership 
Reconsidered " The Business History Review 74, no. 3 (2000). William Moore, The Reorganization of Railroad 
Corporations (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941). Skeel, Debt's Dominion: A History of 
Bankruptcy Law in America.  
 
36
 Greenberg, Financiers and Railroads, 1869-1889. 
 38 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
37
 Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900, A-3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 21. 
 
38
 Commercial banks mainly provided short term credit to railroads, not long term loans. 
 
39
 Moulton, ed., The American Transportation Problem, 300-01. 
 
40
 Ibid. lxv 
 
41
 Ibid. 833 
 
42
 American Bankers Association, "Automotive Transportation and Railroads: A Study of Relationships,"  (New 
York City, N.Y.: 1927), 12. 
 
43
 Ibid. 33 
 
44
 Ibid., 27.  
 
45
 Ibid. 12 
 
46
 Federal Coordinator of Transportation, "Is There Need for a Radical or Major Change in the Organization, 
Conduct and Regulation of the Railroad Industry Which Can Be Accomplished by Federal Legislation.," ed. 
Committee on Interstate Commerce (US Government Printing Office, 1934). 
 
47
 As noted in my discussion of relevant historiography (see “Historiographic Context,” above), historians have long 
debated whether or to what extent poor quality of rail management contributed to the decline of rail in the United 
States. I do not engage this debate here, since to do so would take me beyond the conceptual boundaries of this 
article. That said, I am indebted to Albert Churella for the following comment on “managerial incompetence” 
interpretations. “There seems to be a predilection for blaming people for what were more likely secular changes in 
the rail industry and the transportation sector of the US economy.  Some say the fault lay in the „dead hand‟ of 
regulation, even though…the ICC was a well-managed entity, especially under Eastman. Others say that it was 
managerial incompetence.  I think that it is more likely that, post-1887, the ICC validated the railroads‟ long-
standing policies of rate discrimination and value-of-service pricing—including their propensity to use high tariffs 
on manufactured goods to cross-subsidize rates on grain, coal and other bulk commodities that, ICC officials 
recognized, were essential to the functioning of the American industrial economy. It was a great system, except that 
trucks quickly took away most of the high-value traffic. That was not management‟s fault. That said, after World 
War I and perhaps even earlier, smart and ambitious young men tended to avoid a career in the RR industry.  The 
real chance for success lay elsewhere, in autos, chemicals, and other rapidly growing sectors of the American 
economy, where salaries were, on average, twice what a comparable position paid in railroading.” (Churella, private 
communication) For further information on these matters, Professor Churella points interested readers to: K. Revell, 
Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Pubic Policy in New York City, 1898-1938 
 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2003).  
 
48
 E. White, "Banking and Finance in the 20th Century," in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, 
ed. S. Engerman, R. Gallman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
49
 Moulton, ed., The American Transportation Problem, 61-63.  
 
50
 Olson, Saving Capitalism. 42-45. Also various documents from RG 237, Archive II, U.S. National Archives. 
 
51
 Reconstruction Finance Corporation, "Quarterly Report,"  (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1932). 
 
 39 
                                                                                                                                                             
52
 Reconstruction Finance Corporation, "Monthly Reports,"  (Washington, D.C.: Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, 1932-1940). 
 
53
 Interstate Commerce Commission, "Annual Reports,"  (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1932-1939). 
 
54
 Carosso, A History of Investment Banking in America. Another relevant source in this regard is the memoir 
written by Jesse Jones, President and Chairman of the Board of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under 
Roosevelt, which is based on primary source documents. Concerning the rail assets of investment banks, Jones 
writes that the RFC “(paid) a loan of $14,700,000 to J.P. Morgan and Company, the (Missouri Pacific Railroad‟s) 
banking house…”, as well as granting other loans to private investment banks, commercial and savings banks and 
insurance companies that held devalued rail securities. So Jones provides additional evidence that private investment 
banks were heavily invested in rail securities up to the Great Depression. J.H. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars (New 
York: Macmillan, 1951). 
 
55
 A common interpretation of investor behavior during the Depression is that financial institutions were shoring up 
their balance sheets so they could extend new loans to companies and businesses needing capital, thereby 
attenuating the credit crunch (see Olson, 1988). The data in Tables 4 and 5 does not support this argument. Instead 
the data shows that finance capital moved its credit out of both railroad and other corporate investments into mostly 
secure notes of the U.S. Treasury and state and local governments. 
 
56
 C.M. Clay, What Shall We Do About the Railroads (Washington, D.C.: Ransdell, 1939). 59 
 
57
 Ibid., 59.60 
 
58
 A. Chandler, The Railroads--the Nation's First Big Business (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965), S. 
Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road and Rail (New York: Basic Books, 1994), Martin, 
Enterprise Denied, Stover, American Railroads, Thompson, The Passenger Train in the Motor Age. 
 
59
 Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970. James C. Nelson, Railroad Transportation and Public 
Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1959). 
 
60
 Campbell, The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893-1900  
 
61
 Martin, Enterprise Denied, Stover, American Railroads, F. Wilner, "Railroads and the Marketplace,"  
(Washington, D.C.: Association of American Railroads, 1987). Martin also argues that ICC regulations in the 1890‟s 
and early 20
th
 Century held freight rates and passenger fares artificially low and thereby exacerbated the problem of 
duplication of lines.  
 
62
 Mertins, National Transportation Policy in Transition. 26-27. Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 
1900-1970. 
 
63
 Rose, The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines and American Public Policy in 
the Twentieth Century. 25-26. Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970. 47ff. 
 
64
 Saunders, Merging Lines: American Railroads, 1900-1970. 63-64.  
65
 Ibid. 
 
66
 Olson, Saving Capitalism. 118. Also Claude Fuess, Joseph B. Eastman: Servant of the People 
 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952). Latham, 1959 
 40 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
67
 Bills were introduced in Congress during 1935 in the House of Representatives (H.R. 7541) and 1936 in the 
Senate (S. 2573) providing for gradual introduction of government ownership. H.B. Summers, Summers, R.E., eds., 
The Railroad Problem: With Reference to Government Ownership (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1939). 123. 
 
68
 The new provisions Chapter 204, sec. 77, 47 Statute 1474 (1933, amended 1935) provided for a binding 2/3 vote 
by classes of creditors and assured a prominent role for the ICC, which now would propose trustees, set limits on 
compensation of lawyers and pass judgment on any proposed reorganization plan. From the reformers' perspective, 
"(a)lthough the ICC's powers were not nearly so sweeping as some lawmakers wanted, they promised to increase the 
role of governmental oversight to the detriment of private negotiations among the parties themselves."  See Skeel, 
Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America. 106. 
 
69
 Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States. 
 
70
 Ibid. 54. 
 
71
 Rose, The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines and American Public Policy in 
the Twentieth Century. 71. 
 
72
 Transportation, "Is There Need for a Radical or Major Change in the Organization, Conduct and Regulation of the 
Railroad Industry Which Can Be Accomplished by Federal Legislation.." 
 
73
 Title 1, Section 4 of Act. 
 
74
 E. Latham, The Politics of Railroad Coordination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959 
). 
 
75
 Ibid., 253-57. 
 
76
 Orren, Coporate Power and Social Change. 
 
77
 Roy, Socializing Capital. 
 
78
 John Zysman, Government, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).  
 
79
 Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900. Plus, highway-based transport was 
expanding during the inter-war period partly due to government subsidies for road building. See Goddard, Getting 
There: The Epic Struggle between Road and Rail. John Rae, The Road and Car in American Life (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1971). Nelson, Railroad Transportation and Public Policy. 
 
80
 Hypothetically, railways could have won back that sponsorship, or funded capital requirements through internal 
financing, or looked to government for additional loans. None of those options was possible during the Great 
Depression, with railway finances in such perilous condition. Nor did they become more possible anytime soon 
thereafter. After the Depression ended (excluding World War II, which briefly propped up their finances), passenger 
railways were unable to gain access to private credit and freight railroads did not regain significant access to the 
credit markets until the 1960‟s, well after the shift to highway-based transport was far advanced. As for government 
loans, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ceased to exist in the early 1950‟s and, by that time, American 
government policy had shifted strongly towards support of highways, particularly with passage of the Interstate 
Highway Act in 1954. Stock issuances and/or internal financing were the other options for railways, but with their 
finances in decline by the 1950‟s, these were not viable. Further discussion of these matters, however, would take 
this paper beyond its temporal boundaries. My basic point remains that the 1930‟s were a watershed period for 
railways in the U.S., which laid a financial foundation for highway-based transport to replace them as the dominant 
mode in the American transportation system in the decades after the Depression ended. 
 
 41 
                                                                                                                                                             
81
 Martin, Enterprise Denied, Stover, American Railroads, Wilner, "Railroads and the Marketplace." 
 
82
 Thompson, The Passenger Train in the Motor Age. 
 
83
 Martin, Enterprise Denied. 352-364 
 
84
 Thompson, The Passenger Train in the Motor Age. 6-7 
 
85
 Transportation, "Is There Need for a Radical or Major Change in the Organization, Conduct and Regulation of the 
Railroad Industry Which Can Be Accomplished by Federal Legislation.." Summers, The Railroad Problem: With 
Reference to Government Ownership. Mertins, National Transportation Policy in Transition. 
